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ISSUES ON REPLY 
It is apparent from the Second Injury Fund's arguments that 
there is a tacit fundamental misunderstanding of Mr. Bunnell's 
claim which distorts the nature of the claim and, therefore, the 
nature of the proof needed to establish the claim. The 
commission seems to hold the same incorrect View. The purpose of 
this reply is to explicate the implicit assumptions about the 
case and show how a correct view of the nature of the claim 
affects the relevance and weight of the evidence in such a way as 
to render most of the defendant's evidence irrelevant and to 
clarify the value and weight of Mr. Bunnell's evidence so as to 
justify his position that no substantial evidence supports the 
commission's denial of his well supported claim. 
For a summary of argument please see the Summary and 
Conclusions at the end. 
FACTS ESSENTIAL FOR REPLY 
As a starting point of reference it is understood and agreed 
that in 1968 Mr. Bunnell became permanently and totally disabled 
by pulmonary problems. The Second Injury Fund acknowledges that 
fact in its response brief on page 4 in the summary of arguments. 
There is also no dispute that Mr. Bunnell was severely 
injured in an industrial accident in 1953 which included blunt 
chest injury with several broken ribs followed by x-ray evidence 
of infiltrates or "consolidations" into the lungs. 
The question before the industrial commission was whether 
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the pulmonary failure which disabled Mr. Bunnell in 1968 was 
caused by the 1953 industrial accident. 
ARGUMENT 
The Second Injury Fund's arguments on the evidence all 
appear to be targeting facts which are not really probative or 
relevant to the central issue unless certain implicit assumptions 
are accepted which are not correct. 
The first assumption is that the pulmonary failure which 
caused Mr. Bunnell to become disabled in 1968 was the same thing 
as the coughing problem. The cough is reported variously as 
existing more than a year before September 1968. It got worse 
about the first of August 1968 and resulted in Mr. Bunnell's 
being hospitalized several times starting in September 1968. 
The second assumption follows from the first and is that to 
prove his case, Mr. Bunnell had to establish as a fact that the 
1968 cough was contiguous with the 1953 accident. 
These assumptions are implicit in the arguments attempting 
to show: 
1. Absence of chest complaints between 1953 and 1968 
(Respondent brief pp 5-6). 
2. Evidence as to when the cough started (id. p 5). 
3. Evidence referring to the various diagnoses of the 1968 
problem (id. p 6). 
4. Evidence referring to comments on x-ray reports such as 
the "Routine X ray11 requested by the company doctor in 1966, 
all implying that his lung problems were fairly benign prior 
to 1968 (id. pp 6-7). 
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5. Evidence argued from the lack of mention of lung 
problems by the company doctor or by Dr. Lindenfs permanent 
impairment evaluation in 1954 (id. pp 7-8). 
6. Evidence of lack of ratable lung impairment by the 1955 
disability rating board (id. p 8). 
All of these arguments assume that the pulmonary failure was 
the same as the 1968 coughing problem and that Mr. Bunnell had to 
prove that cough was contiguous with the 1953 accident. 
But neither of these assumptions is correct. The lung 
failure was not the cough. It was the failure of the lungs to 
respond normally or to heal normally from whatever caused the 
cough. Whether it was caused by dust at work, or a common cold 
or whatever, a normal lung will heal after a week or two or in 
extreme cases a cough might last six weeks or even three months. 
But Mr. Bunnell's cough lasted over a year, then got worse. He 
was hospitalized. The fits of coughing lasted for hours and 
progressed from a dry cough to where he was coughing up copious 
amounts of fluid. This was not a normal response of healthy 
lungs to a common cough. It was so severe that it led the 
doctors to consider congestive heart failure, emphysema, 
tuberculosis, asthma, allergy and various other possibilities all 
of which were ruled out as discussed in Mr. Bunnell's applicant 
brief. 
The bottom line is that Mr. Bunnell's lungs failed to 
respond normally to the cough when it came along. And it is the 
failure of his lungs to be able to cope with whatever he caught 
in 1968 that is the essential fact, the subject of all inquiry 
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and proof before the industrial commission. 
The central question is whether the 1953 injury to Mr. 
Bunnell's chest was a direct cause of his lung failure that 
rendered him unable to cope with whatever caused his coughing 
problems in 1968. 
It is the incorrect assumption that the lung failure was the 
same thing as the 1968 cough that leads to confusion as to what 
is necessary to be proved, what evidence is necessary and how the 
standard of proof applies. 
Once it is clear that Mr. Bunnell's pulmonary failure refers 
to the lungs1 loss of ability to cope, it would also become clear 
how the evidence shows that Mr. Bunnell's pulmonary failure was 
caused by the industrial accident and why he feels that is the 
one inevitable conclusion to which the evidence leads. 
The first and most obvious result of correcting the 
assumption that the lung failure was the cough is that it is not 
necessary for Mr. Bunnell to prove that the cough was contiguous 
with the 1953 accident. 
The testimony was not to prove that the 1968 cough started 
in 1953. The coughing problems were off-and-on as indicated in 
both the testimony and the medical records. Nor did Mr. Bunnell 
claim disability from lung problems at the time of the disability 
rating in 1955. Thus all the argument and evidence showing 
discontinuity between the 1968 coughing problem and the 1953 
accident are not really relevant. 
The Second result of dropping the incorrect assumptions is 
that this pulmonary failure did not occur in 1968. The pulmonary 
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failure occurred at the time of the accident in 1953 and only 
became totally disabling in 1968. 
This is the essence of Mr. Bunnell's case which he feels the 
evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates and which is not refuted by 
any substantial evidence. 
The fact that the pulmonary failure existed prior to 1968 is 
clearly demonstrated in the 1960 hospitalization record which 
says "Chills, fever, pain in chest and continuous coughing for 3-
4 days. Present illness began 3 days [ago] with slight cold and 
gradually developed in severe above symptoms.n (record p 111). 
Thus as early as 1960 the lungs inability to cope is 
demonstrated dramatically when a slight cold led to 3 or 4 days 
of continuous coughing and finally necessitated hospitalization, 
essentially the same coping failure as was demonstrated in 1968. 
In an obvious attempt to justify or explain this serious 
failure of Mr. Bunnell's lungs to cope normally with a slight 
cold, the same doctor records 1/3 down the same page under his 
systems review: HChest - he was in a severe accident at Geneva 
Steel and his chest was crushed about 3 years ago and fractured 
ribs." 
This evidence is repeated here to show how differently this 
evidence is weighted and viewed when it is considered as evidence 
of Mr. Bunnell';s pulmonary coping failure caused directly by the 
1953 accident and extant since 1953. The same evidence might be 
greatly discounted if the incorrect assumption is adopted that 
what is being proved is that the 1968 coughing was the same thing 
as the lung failure. It is hard to see the connection between a 
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cough in 1960 and another cough in 1968 when there appears to be 
no particular problem in between. But Mr. Bunnell is not 
claiming that either cough was caused by the 1953 accident. The 
1960 cough was originally a slight cold. 
It is neither just nor fair to try to make Mr. Bunnell prove 
that those coughing problems were caused by the industrial 
accident nor to view the evidence as proving or failing to prove 
that causal connection. Yet that appears to be the basis of the 
Second Injury Fund's arguments and the commission's findings. 
What the 1953 accident did do was injure Mr. Bunnell's lungs 
so as to render them incapable of coping; a slight cold in 1960 
led to hospitalization; in 1967 a cough never healed and in 1968 
led to more hospitalizations and total disability. 
To prove his pulmonary failure was caused by the industrial 
accident Mr. Bunnell presented the hospital records from 1968, 
1960 and 1953 demonstrating clearly the injury to the chest and 
the subsequent pulmonary failure to cope with common ailments. 
This evidence was bolstered by x-ray reports from before the 
accident which mention no lung problems, the initial 
hospitalization X rays which show progressive development of x-
ray evidence and subsequent X rays which all show evidence of 
lung abnormality (Usually called emphysema by the company doctor 
though actual emphysema was later ruled out). 
Further testimonial evidence showed a pre-accident history 
of exceptional lung health including activity in high school 
sports and as an adult mountain climbing guide. Additional 
evidence of family and fellow workers showed continual on-and-off 
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chronic smokers cough type problems during the 15 years from 1953 
to 1968 demonstrating that the episodes requiring hospitalization 
in 1960 and 1968 were not unique events but were merely extreme 
cases in a continual ongoing struggle in which Mr. Bunnell's 
lungs failed to function as normal healthy lungs. 
Mrs. Bunnell's hearsay testimony which was corroborated by 
the 1968 medical records was that the treating doctor informed 
the Bunnell's in 1953 that his lungs were permanently injured and 
he would have a tendency to get pneumonia. (See Applicant brief 
p 11 paragraph "f" for references.) This pulmonary failure 
started at the time of the 1953 accident and continued until 
1968 when Mr. Bunnell failed to cope with what for a person with 
uninjured lungs might have been a minor cough. But for Mr. 
Bunnell, because of his injury and resulting pulmonary failure, 
this became a totally disabling event. 
With all the evidence, the cause of Mr. Bunnell's disability 
might seem obvious to a layman without more. But Mr. Bunnell 
also offered the uncontradicted opinion evidence of two treating 
doctors. 
Mr. Bunnell's evidence takes on a different significance 
when the pulmonary failure is properly understood to mean the 
failure of his lungs to cope, rather than as tacitly and 
incorrectly understood by the Second Injury Fund and the 
commission to refer to the 1968 coughing problem. 
Correcting this misunderstanding has even greater 
significance in evaluating whether any substantial contrary 
evidence exists. Two examples will illustrate. The "substantial 
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contrary evidence" the Second Injury Fund asks us to rely on 
consists of: 
1. A hearsay statement in medical history referring to 16 
years of no f,Chest Complaints.H (Respondent brief p 5, applicant 
brief p 21, Record p 127). If this is granted as ambiguous and 
resolved in favor of the commission^ interpretation, it stands 
alone in contradiction of massive amounts of testimony and 
medical record evidence including hospitalization records of 1960 
which show it is simply not true. If it is granted as true( 
giving benefit of any doubt, what then does it mean. It is a bit 
of medical history to be taken into account along with a great 
number of other medical facts. After a courageous leap from that 
to some conclusion about causation (which goes against the 
treating physician's opinion), we have , at best, a bit of 
evidence that might be distantly relevant to proving that Mr. 
Bunnell's 1968 coughing problem was not caused by the industrial 
accident. But that assumes that the pulmonary failure refers to 
the 1968 coughing problem. Mr. Bunnell doesnft claim that cough 
started in 1953. And if this unlikely leap of faith is taken as 
fact, a 16 year period of "no chest complaint" bears no relevance 
if Mr. Bunnellfs pulmonary failure amounted to a loss of his 
lungs' capacity to cope with a causal agent that did not appear 
until 16 years later. 
2. The second bit of evidence we are asked to rely on is 
alleged X-ray evidence that lung problems existed in 1952 prior 
to the accident (Referred to in respondent brief on pp 6, 8 top, 
9 bottom). 
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The only evidence in the record for this assertion is in a 
1966 X-ray report (Record p 114) which says the "appearance of 
the chest is very similar to that seen in 1952.tf This comment 
was brought up off the record and objected to as probably a 
typographical error or mistaken date since the only 1952 X ray 
was to check of rib fracture and makes no mention of any other 
problems. (Record p 88) Furthermore, the chest X rays the day of 
the accident, 11-13-53 also make no mention of lung problems 
other than fractured ribs though lung "consolidations" do appear 
in follow-up X rays 9 days later (Record p 95). 
The defendants dropped the point at that time and made no 
effort to offer the 1952 X Rays to prove pre-existing lung 
problems. The administrative law judge did not rely on that 
evidence or make any finding regarding X-ray evidence of pre-
existing lung problems, and the Second Injury Fund did not offer 
to argue that point on appeal to the commission. It seems 
inappropriate that they now ask us to rely on that evidence. 
If it is taken as true evidence, however, it has not 
substantial probative value on the question of the pulmonary 
failure since there was no evidence, given that the X rays did 
show scarring, that such scarring related tp any pulmonary 
problems. The only evidence was that prior to the accident Mr. 
Bunnell had exceptionally healthy lungs except perhaps for some 
childhood bronchitis which in any case had caused no lung 
breakdown during the years between his high school athletics and 
age 50 when the fall occurred. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
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The evidence and arguments made by the Second Injury Fund 
and the commission are based on a the incorrect and tacit 
assumption that Mr. Bunnell's pulmonary failure consisted of the 
coughing problem that disabled him in 1968 and that, therefore, 
the case turned on evidence of the nature of the 1968 diagnoses 
and contiguity between the coughing and the 1953 accident. 
Defendants urge rejection of Mr. Bunnell's claim on that basis. 
Mr. Bunnell's claim is, however, that his pulmonary failure 
consists in loss of capacity to cope with common ailments. A 
massive amount of evidence demonstrated the nature and extent of 
this loss of coping ability and showed that it did not exist 
before the accident but did immediately and continuously 
thereafter and was caused thereby. It was predicted by the 
treating doctor in 1953 and demonstrated by a long history of 
chronic coughing, hospitalization following failure to cope with 
a slight cold in 1960 and finally total disability when his lungs 
were unable to cope with whatever agent caused his problems in 
1968. 
Any relevant contrary evidence is so insubstantial that to 
deny Mr. Bunnell's claim on the basis thereof would constitute an 
arbitrary and capricious denial. 
Even if some modicum of substantial evidence were found, to 
reject Mr. Bunnell's claim on that basis in light of the massive 
amount of evidence in his favor would bring into serious question 
as a separate issue whether there were any substantial evidence 
to show that Mr. Bunnell failed to prove his case by a 
preponderance of the evidence, which was the only ultimate 
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finding of the commission. 
Accordingly, Mr. Bunnell requests his case be remanded to 
the commission with an order to enter findings in accordance with 
the only inevitable conclusion supported by the evidence. 
Dated this 29th day of November, 1986. 
\ 
r->AM 
Bruce Wilson 
Attorney for Applicant 
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